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CALVIN AND INSIGNIFYING GROUNDS
Andrew McCafferty

Calvin claims that various created objects contain "marks" or "insignia" of
being created by God. Using some examples, I first distinguish between
insignifying and non-insignifying grounds for a basic belief-Calvin's claim
being that we have insignifying grounds for belief in God. I then develop a
"probabilistic support thesis." As a first approximation the thesis is that an
insignifying disposition to form a basic belief is noetic ally proper only if the
belief is probable relative to propositions describing the features which trigger the disposition. The direct implication for Calvin is that our insignifying
disposition to believe that God created an object is noetically proper only if
this belief has this property.
John Calvin claims that our universe has unmistakable marks of being God's
creation. He writes,
[God] discloses himself in the whole workmanship of the universe. As a
consequence, men cannot open their eyes without being compelled to see
him .... Upon his individual works he has engraved unmistakable marks of
his glory, so clear and so prominent that even unlettered folks cannot plead
the excuse of ignorance.)
He expresses this same idea in various ways. He writes that we see in creation
"signs of divinity," "innumerable evidences ... that declare his wonderful wisdom," "insignia whereby he shows his glory to us. "2
Alvin Plantinga interprets Calvin as maintaining that seeing certain objects
(the night sky, a field of flowers, etc.) triggers in us a belief that God created
them. This belief is not derived from other beliefs by a reasoning process. It
is a basic belief grounded in the experience itself.3 Although this is reasonable, to articulate Calvin's view we must also distinguish between "insignifying" grounds and "non-insignifying" grounds for basic beliefs. The purpose
of this paper is to make this distinction and raise some questions about it.

1. Insignifying Grounds for a Basic Belief
What does Calvin mean when he claims that created works bear God's marks
and insignia? The sense of this can be illustrated by some examples:
(1) A painting which bears Rembrandt's insignia. Suppose I see a painting

in an art museum, and immediately realize, based on its look, that it is
a Rembrandt painting. The painting evidences itself to be a Rembrandt,
containing his insignia.
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(2) A symphony which bears the insignia of being the work of a great
musician. Suppose I hear my first Bach symphony and am highly impressed. The symphony evidences to me that Bach was a good musician.
(3) A dress which bears the insignia of a bridesmaid's dress. Suppose I'm
at a formal party and realize that a certain woman is wearing a bridesmaid's dress. I might not know how I know this. The dress just has a
bridesmaid's dress look.
(4) A tree which bears the insignia of an oak tree. Suppose a fellow employee asks me what type of tree is in front of our office building. I look
out the window at it and immediately answer, based on its look, that it
is an oak tree. The tree bears the insignia of an oak tree.

These are plausible analogies to Calvin's claim. In each example an experience triggers a disposition in me to form a belief. This experience does not
involve reasoning. Rather, the belief arises from perceiving certain marks or
insignia.
I will call an experience of this sort an "insignifying ground" for the belief. 4
Some commonplace examples of non-insignifying grounds for a basic belief
would be:
(5) I begin to wonder about what kind of tree is in front of my office
building. After a few seconds of thinking, I remember that it is an oak
tree.
(6) I want to know what kind of tree is in front of our office building, so I
ask a fellow employee. He tells me that it is an oak tree and I unquestionably believe him.
(7) I read in our office newsletter that an oak tree has been planted in front
of our building. Without thinking, I form the belief that this is so.

In each of these cases my belief is basic. However, it is not grounded in
perceiving marks or insignia of an oak tree or of one being in front of my
office building.
As an example of non-insignifying grounds for a basic theistic belief,
suppose a young child is told by her mother that God is good. If the circumstances are right. this experience will ground a basic belief in the child.
However. the child does not have the type of ground to which Calvin is
pointing. The child does not see God's insignia.

2. Insignifying Grounds and Probability
The distinction between insignifying and non-insignifying grounds raises
complex issues. I limit myself to developing-in an exploratory way-a
"probabilistic support thesis" (PST). I begin by stating a preliminary version
of the thesis. I then isolate the question it addresses, consider four objections,
and comment on its implications for Calvin.
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Call a disposition "insignifying" if it gives insignifying grounds for a belief. As a first approximation, the probabilistic support thesis (PST) is that if
a disposition to believe Q is insignifying, then the triggering features of the
disposition make Q probable. For example, PST asserts that when I believe
on insignifying grounds that a tree is an oak tree, the tree having the features
which trigger my disposition make it probable that the tree is an oak tree. 5
A full defense of PST would require a discussion of probability. Here I
simply assume that probability is an a priori, logical, objective relation between propositions. Although this theory is not problem free, of existing
theories it is the one closest to what is intended by PST. PST is the thesis
that propositions describing the triggering features of an insignifying disposition partially entail the belief.
The question which PST addresses is how the reliability of insignifying
dispositions can be explained. To see why this is a problem, consider a
non-insignifying disposition such as memory. It is a matter of debate what
features trigger memory, but a plausible candidate is that the remembered
proposition comes into mind with a certain "memory" feeling. The reliability
of memory can be explained (roughly) as follows: this triggering feature
reliably indicates that the proposition is in my memory, and this in turn
reliably indicates that the belief is true.
The reliability of insignifying dispositions can't be explained in this way.
The triggering features do not indicate that the belief is included in some
other source of information. Rather (according to PST) the triggering features
of insignifying dispositions directly support the belief. An insignifying disposition is reliable because the belief is probable relative to propositions
describing these features.
I use the Rembrandt example to raise objections to PST, and briefly argue
that they don't show that PST is unreasonable. In this example a subject is
in a museum and features of a painting trigger an insignifying disposition to
believe that it is a Rembrandt. These features would be difficult to pinpoint.
But perhaps they are properties such as a Rembrandtesque color, texture,
theme, etc. They may also include that the overall painting has a certain
Rembrandtesque look.
As a first objection, suppose that our subject's disposition to believe that
a painting is a Rembrandt is triggered by Picasso paintings and not Rembrandt
paintings. The disposition may still be insignifying; it may be triggered by
noticing certain marks or insignia. However, the features of the painting
which trigger the belief would not make it probable that the painting is a
Rembrandt.
The point of this objection is that PST is meant to apply only to noetically
proper or non-defective insignifying dispositions. PST should be read:
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PST-version 2

If a noetically proper disposition to believe Q is insignifying, then Q is

probable relative to propositions describing the disposition's triggering features.
This answers the objection because an insignifying disposition to believe of
Picasso paintings that they are Rembrandts would be noetic ally defective.
A second objection argues that even if our subject's disposition is proper,
the features which trigger it don't make it a priori probable that the painting
is a Rembrandt. There is no logical connection between a painting having
Rembrandtesque features and its being a Rembrandt. One might even argue
that a priori it is just as likely that Picasso would paint with Rembrandt's
style as it is that Rembrandt would.
In reply, implicit in PST is that the features of the disposition together with
a set of contextually provided background propositions must make the belief
probable. We have:
PST-version 3
If a noetically proper disposition to believe Q is insignifying, then Q is

probable relative to propositions describing the disposition's triggering features together with background knowledge.
A plausible assumption (which I don't defend here) is that background propositions consist of the subject's relevant knowledge. This would include some
knowledge about how Rembrandt painted (it includes at least that a certain
set of paintings which the subject has seen before are Rembrandts, and that
another set are not). It would also include various other propositions such as
that painters tend to paint in a consistent style. Relative to this background
knowledge, it is not unreasonable to suppose that propositions describing the
triggering features of our subject's disposition partially entail that the painting is a Rembrandt. 6
As a third objection, suppose that it is known to our subject that the museum
contains a mixture of Rembrandt forgeries and authentic Rembrandt paintings. Suppose as well that she is able to distinguish between these-and so
her disposition to believe that the painting she sees is a Rembrandt is noetically proper in this context. 7 It still may be the case that the features which
trigger the disposition are as likely to be present in forgeries as in authentic
Rembrandt paintings (and so these features don't make it probable that the
painting is a Rembrandt as opposed to a forgery). Perhaps our subject uses
certain additional flaws which forgeries have to recognize when a painting
is a forgery.
To be more precise, let k be our subject's background knowledge, t be a
conjunctive proposition describing her disposition's triggering features, f be
that the painting is a forgery, and r be that the painting is an (authentic)
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Rembrandt. In the context envisioned, before seeing the painting the subject
knows it is either a forgery or a Rembrandt, but has no reason to favor one
of these; that is, p(rlk) equals p(jlk) equals one-half. Now, even though our
subject can distinguish authentic Rembrandt paintings from forgeries, it still
may be the case that p(tlfk) is as great as p(tlr.k)-and so by Bayes' theorem
piflt.k) is as great as p(rlt.k). This may be the case if the way our subject
distinguishes forgeries is to spot some defect in them-some defect unrelated
to the features which trigger her disposition to believe that this painting is a
Rembrandt.
In reply, our subject's disposition (in the context envisioned) is proper only
because forgeries have certain defects which she notices and which prevent
the disposition from firing. Call such a defect a "defeater" for her disposition.
To define "defeater" we would need to take into account defeaters for defeaters. However, the intuitive idea is enough for our purposes, and we modify
PST to read:
PST-Final version
If a noetically proper disposition to believe Q is insignifying, then Q is
probable relative to (l) propositions describing the dispositions triggering
features, (2) the negations of propositions describing its defeaters and (3)
background knowledge.

This version of PST overcomes the counter-example. Let -d be the negation
of the disjunction of propositions describing the defeaters for our subject'S
disposition. Assuming our subject's disposition is proper, it is not unreasonable to assume that p(t.-dlr.k) will be significantly higher than p(t.-dlf.k),
and so r will be highly probable relative to t.-d.k.
A final objection, raised by an anonymous referee, involves a case of what
Thomas Reid calls "original perception":
Reid thinks, for example, that among our powers of original perception is
the ability, even of tiny infants, to perceive certain emotional states through
the "natural language" of grimaces, voice, etc. In this connection, Reid mentions a man who could make babies cry by whistling a "sad" melody, or make
them laugh by whistling a jig. Suppose that Reid is right about there being
a power of "original" perception. Consider then a well played blues harmonica improviser, who can, through what he spontaneously plays, manifest or
evidence an emotional state, triggering in us beliefs about the emotions he
means to be expressing (or portraying). Does this entail that propositions
describing the tune (the written score of it, say) must make probable some
conclusion about the emotions the song is meant to manifest?

A minor problem with the objection is that it is unclear what the features are
which trigger the disposition to believe that the musician means to express,
say, a "blues" emotion. I don't see that we should suppose it is the written
score-a written score can be played in different ways. The key feature may
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be that the music has a certain phenomenal feel-a feel which we can identify
as a "blues" feel.
A more serious problem concerns background knowledge. What background knowledge must a person have for a tune to "manifest" a blues emotion? Perhaps the point of the disposition's being a power of original
perception is that the subject does not need to have heard any similar tunes
before. Still, it would seem to be the case that the subject must know something about blues emotions and the way they are usually expressed.
These problems aside, is this a counter-example to PST? The force of the
objection can be seen by considering a simple version of one of Plantinga's
"accidentally reliable" examples. 8 Consider world p-a possible world exactly like ours, except that (1) a trumpet sound in p triggers a belief that there
is an elephant nearby and (2) whenever a trumpet sounds in p an invisible
elephant is created nearby.
In world p (as on earth), a trumpet sound (the triggering feature of the
disposition) does not make it probable that there is an elephant nearby (the
belief formed). However, this example is not a counter-example to PST for
two reasons. First, the disposition would not be noetically proper (even
though reliable). Second, the disposition would not be insignifying. The trumpet would not "manifest" that there is an elephant nearby.9
The blues musician example, as I understand it, is an attempt to give an
"accidentally reliable" example which overcomes these points. In contrast to
the world p example, a blues phenomenal feel to a song does trigger in us a
proper insignifying disposition to believe that the song is meant to express a
blues emotional state. Yet, it is being suggested, as in the world p example,
the connection between the triggering feature and the belief is contingentthe triggering feature does not make the belief probable.
A mistaken reply to this objection is that in world p the trumpet sound
actually does makes it probable that there is an elephant nearby (and so a
fortiori a blues phenomenal feel makes it probable that the song is meant to
express a blues emotion). There are two reasons it might be thought that the
trumpet sound makes the presence of an elephant probable, but both of these
miss the point of PST.
First, in world p the trumpet sound would make the presence of an elephant
probable if we included in our background knowledge that the disposition is
reliable (or that an elephant is created nearby when a trumpet sounds). But
the claim of PST, if it is to be interesting, must be that the features which
trigger the disposition make the belief probable apart from any assumptions
about the reliability of the disposition. Otherwise, we couldn't use PST to
explain why the disposition is reliable-which is what PST is meant to do.
Second, on a relative frequency theory of probability it is true that in world
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the trumpet sound makes it probable that an elephant is nearby. But, probability in PST is not relative frequency. The world ~ example illustrates why.
This reading of probability at least threatens to make PST trivial. A proper
insignifying disposition is reliable (I assume), and so the features which
trigger it will be highly correlated with the truth of the belief. This is true
even for accidentally reliable dispositions, but it is just such dispositions that
PST is meant to rule out as insignifying.
The blues musician example is complex. The nature of the connection between
an emotion and outward expressions of it is complex, and it is difficult at
best to make a probability judgement here. But 1 don't see that it is implausible
to suppose that a well played blues song together with background knowledge
makes it probable that the song is meant to express a blues emotion.
Finally, what are the implications of PST for Calvin? Calvin claims that
the night sky gives proper in signifying grounds for the belief that God created
it. The features of the night sky which trigger this belief are hard to specify,
but would seem to include it having a certain beauty, vastness, and order. PST
immediately implies that if this disposition is noetically proper, then propositions describing these features together with background knowledge and the
absence of any defeaters make it probable that God created the night sky.
This implication is not that the subject (or anyone else) must be able to
reason from these propositions to the belief that God exists. PST is not a
thesis about reasoning or the ability to reason on reflection. All that is required is that, as a matter of fact, these propositions make the belief probable.
I think it is reasonable to suppose that they do, but must leave this for further
discussion. 10

Louisiana State University
Tao Sheng Seminary, Taipei
NOTES
1. Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.5.1,1559 edition, ed. J. McNeill, trans. F. L.
Battles, Library of Christian Classics (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1960).
2. Ibid., 1.5.4, 1.5.3, and 1.5.1.
3. See Alvin Plantinga, "Reason and Belief in God" in Faith and Rationality, eds. Alvin
Plantinga and Nicholas WoIterstorff (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1983).
4. The phrase "in signifying ground" was suggested to me by an anonymous referee.
5. I'm assuming that the dispositions are individuated by their triggering features, so
that it is permissible to speak of "the" triggering features of a disposition. On the other
hand, as noted later, I don't assume that every relevant change in context individuates
dispositions.
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6. Actually, most people have a good deal of relevant background information about
Rembrandt and museums. Most people know that Rembrandt is one of a relatively small
number of famous painters and that museums tend to have paintings by such painters.
Including this sort of information in background knowledge eliminates a variety of related
objections. For example, the information that museums do not display imitations makes
it irrelevant that there is a high probability that there are many Rembrandt imitations which
have the features which trigger our subject's disposition.
7. A disposition may be noetic ally proper in a context known to contain only Rembrandt
and Picasso paintings, but not in a context known to contain Rembrandt paintings and
Rembrandt forgeries. This requires speaking of "noetic ally proper in a context" rather than
simply "noetically proper."
8. See Alvin Plantinga, "Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function" in Philosophical Perspectives, 2, Epistemology, ed. James Tomberlin (Atascadero, California:
Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1988).
9. The kind of evidence I would have for the presence of an elephant in world ~ would
not be the kind of evidence Calvin is suggesting we have that God created the world.
10. A crucial question is whether we should take it as part of background knowledge
that God exists. Dewey Hoitenga argues that Calvin's claim that we can see God's insignia
assumes Calvin's sensus divinitatis. He writes, "We can take Calvin as holding that
knowing the universe as a sign of God presupposes knowing God himself as the creator
whom it signifies." Hoitenga, Faith and Reason from Plato to Piantinga (Albany, NY:
State University of New York Press, 1991), p. 156.
I would like to thank an anonymous referee for extended comments on an earlier version
of this paper.

